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The Solely-for-Voting-Stock Requirement in "B" 
Reorganizations Satisfied by Cash Payments 
for Fractional Shares-Mills v. 
Commissioner* 
[Vol. 63 
The Internal Revenue Code requires recognition of gains or 
losses realized upon a sale or exchange of property.1 An exception 
to this general rule is found in section 354(a)(l), the basic non-
recognition provision for stock-for-stock reorganizations. This sec-
• 331 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964). 
1, JNT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 1002. 
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tion provides that a stockholder need not recognize gains or losses 
"if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, 
in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for 
stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a 
party to the reorganization."2 However, before section 354 can be 
reached, the exchange must satisfy one of the definitions of re-
organization found in section 368.3 Unless one of these definitional 
requirements is met, section 354 will be inapplicable and all gains 
and losses must be fully realized. On the other hand, even though 
section 368 is satisfied, section 354 will not be applicable if property 
other than stock or securities has been transferred to a shareholder 
in the acquired corporation. In that situation a companion clause, 
section 356, the so-called "boot" provision, requires total nonrecog-
nition of losses4 and the recognition of gains but in an amount not 
to exceed the fair market value of the boot received.5 
This tight interrelationship among sections 368, 354, and 356 has 
severely limited the possibility of partial nonrecognition in the case 
of a stock-for-stock "B" reorganization. This type of reorganization 
is defined in section 368(a)(l)(B) as 
"The acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all 
or a part of its voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part 
of the voting stock of a corporation which is in control of the 
acquiring corporation), of stock of another corporation if, im-
mediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has 
control of such other corporation (whether or not such acquir-
ing corporation had control immediately before the acquisi-
tion)."6 
When voting stock is the sole consideration for the stock acquired, 
the definitional language of section 368(a)(l)(B) is explicitly satis-
fied, total nonrecognition is provided by section 354, and a share-
holder need not resort to section 356 for partial nonrecognition. 
However, if the acquiring corporation gives up property in addi-
tion to its voting stock, it would appear that the definitional Ian-
2. INT. REY. CODE OF 1954, § 354(a)(l). (Emphasis added.) The effect of this provi-
sion is to defer recognition rather than to eliminate the taxable event. See generally 
Cavitch, Reorganization Techniques in Corporate Planning, 19 Bus. LAw. 429, 432 
(1964). 
3. INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 368(a)(l). There are six kinds of reorganizations. 
They are commonly referred to as "A," "B," "C," "D," "E" and "F" reorganizations. 
These letter designations refer to the subsections of § 368(a)(l) in which they are 
defined. 
4. INT, REY. CODE OF 1954, § 356(c). 
5. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 356(a)(l). "Boot" refers to cash or other property 
which does not qualify as either stock or securities. 
6. INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 368(a)(l)(B). (Emphasis added.) Control is defined 
as the ownership of stock possessing at least 80% of the total combined voting power 
of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of the total number of shares 
of all other classes of stock of the corporation. INT. REY. CoDE OF 1954, § 368(c). 
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guage of section 368(a)(l)(B) is not met. As a result, the transaction 
does not qualify as a reorganization for purposes of section 354, and 
356 can never be reached. Thus, unless boot is permitted under the 
solely-for-voting-stock definition of section 368(a)(l)(B) itself, 
section 356 has no operative effect in stock-for-stock "B" reorganiza-
tions and gains and losses are fully recognized.7 
In Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Co.,8 which arose in the con-
text of a stock-for-property "C" reorganization, the United States 
Supreme Court construed language identical to that now found in 
section 368(a)(l)(B)9 and held that" 'solely' leaves no leeway. Voting 
stock plus some other consideration does not meet the statutory 
requirement."10 In addition, until recently, lower court cases which 
had explicitly ruled on the solely requirement in the context of a 
"B" reorganization had followed the Southwest Consol. decision.11 
Thus, even fractional interests in "B" reorganizations had to be 
handled so that no cash flowed directly from the acquiring corpo-
ration to the shareholders of the acquired corporation.12 However, 
7. In Howard v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956), it was held that the 
boot provisions of § 112(c) of the 1939 Code (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 356(a)(l)) 
were applicable even though there was no reorganization under § 112(g)(l)(B) (now 
INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(l)(B)). The United States Supreme Court overruled 
the Howard decision in Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 337 (1961), but did not 
decide the issue of whether some boot might be allowed under § 112(g)(l)(B). Id. at 
344. See generally Note, 71 YALE L.J. 1316 (1962). 
8. 315 U.S. 194 (1942). 
9. The relevant statute in the Southwest Consol. Co. case, supra note 8, was the 
Revenue Act of 1934. In that act the stock-for-stock "B" reorganization and the stock.-
for-property "C" reorganization were defined in the same subsection as follows: "The 
term 'reorganization' means ••• (B) the acquisition by one corporation in exchange 
solely for all or a part of its voting stock: of at least 80 per centum of the voting 
stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes 
of stock of another corporation; or of substantially all the properties of another cor-
poration ..•. " Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g)(l)(B), 48 Stat. 705. (Emphasis 
added.) In 1939 the "B" reorganization was separated from the "C" reorganization 
definition. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 112(g)(l)(B),(C), 53 Stat. 870 (now INT. R.Ev. 
CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(l)(B),(C)). 
10. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Co., 315 U.S. 194, 198 (1942). Accord, Central 
Kan. Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 213 (10th Cir. 1944); Pressed Steel Car Co. 
v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1293 (1944), affd per curiam, 152 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. 
denied, 328 U.S. 838 (1946). 
11. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Air Reduction Co., 130 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
317 U.S. 681 (1942) (alternative holding); Hubert E. Howard, 24 T.C. 792 (1955), 
retld on other grounds, 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956). 
12. The arrangements for handling fractional interests which have been permitted 
without recognition of gain include the following: (1) payments of cash by the acquired 
corporation to its shareholders so that the acquiring corporation need not issue 
fractional shares (see Southland Ice Co., 5 T.C. 842 (1946)); (2) payment of cash by 
the shareholders of the acquired corporation to the acquiring corporation sufficient to 
subscribe to an additional whole share (see Merritt, Tax-Free Corporate Acquisitions 
-.The Law and the Proposed Regulations, 53 MICH. L. REv. 911, 934-35 (1955)); 
(3) issuance by the acquiring corporation of script redeemable for full shares (see 
Rev. Rul. 55-59, 1955-1 CUM. BuLL. 35); (4) purchase by the acquiring corporation 
or its agent, at the direction of a shareholder entitled to a fractional share, of an 
additional fraction to make a whole share (Mills v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 321, 324 
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in the recent case of Mills v. Commissioner13 the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit successfully prevented the harsh tax treatment 
which may result when "solely" is given its literal meaning in a 
situation where a minimal amount of boot is paid for fractional in-
terests in a transaction that is, in substance, a "B" reorganization.14 
In the Mills case, General Gas Corporation agreed to transfer 
some of its voting stock in exchange for taxpayers' shares in three 
small gas companies. The agreement provided that if the value of 
the acquired corporations' stock, as determined by audit, was not 
evenly divisible by the fourteen dollar valuation of General's shares, 
a cash payment would be made in lieu of fractional shares. In re-
turn for their shares, each taxpayer received aventy-seven dollars in 
cash in addition to voting shares of General valued at 29,912 dollars. 
When the taxpayers did not report any income for this transaction 
in their federal income tax returns, the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue assessed deficiencies on the theory that the transaction 
failed to qualify as a "B" reorganization. The Tax Court ruled for 
the Commissioner, holding that a plan of reorganization did exist 
but that the exchange was not solely for voting stock and, there-
fore, did not qualify as a "B" reorganization.15 In reversing the Tax 
Court decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held 
that the cash paid was not additional consideration within the mean-
(5th Cir. 1964)); (5) sale of a fractional share by the acquiring corporation or its agent 
for the account of shareholders in the acquired corporation. (Ibid.) 
Two other arrangements seem permissible under the "B" definition. The acquired 
corporation could issue sufficient additional shares to its shareholders -prior to the 
'reorganization so that the relative value of shares in the acquired and acquiring 
corporation would be such that the exchange could be carried out in terms of whole 
shares, or the acquiring corporation could actually issue fractional shares which it 
would later repurchase from the former shareholders of the acquired corporation. 
For a full discussion of these arrangements, see Rubenfeld, Handle Expenses, 
Fractional Shares, Escrows in Reorganization With Great Care, 15 J. TAXATION 66 
(1961). 
13. lll!l F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964). See Kanter, Does Small Amount of Cash Boot 
Kill B-type Reorganization?, 21 J. TAXATION 24 (1964). 
14. The Mills case is the first dealing with the interpretation of "solely" to arise 
under the 1954 Code. It would seem that the interpretation under the 1954 Code 
would be the same as under the 1939 Code because the relevant language is unchanged. 
However, several commentators have argued that in order to satisfy § 368(a)(l)(B) of 
the 1954 Code only 80% of that which passes to stockholders of the acquired cor-
poration need be stock. The remaining 20% may be paid in cash or other non-
qualifying property. See Kanter, Cash in a "B" Reorganization-Effect of Cash 
Purchases on "Creeping" Reorganization, 19 TAX L. REv. 441 (1964); Kanter, Boot 
of $27 Kills B-type Reorganization-De Minimis Rule Does Not Apply, 18 J. TAXA· 
TION HIS, 140 (1963); Kanter, CA-9 Says Boot Makes B Reorganization Impossible, 14 
J. TAXATION 222, 226 (1961); Merritt, supra note 12, at 928-29. As yet, this position 
has not been adopted by any court. 
15. Richard M. Mills, 39 T.C. 39ll (1962). Three judges concurred, holding that 
the transaction was an outright sale. Six judges dissented on the theory that the 
cash paid for fractional shares was not additional consideration within the meaning 
of the statute. 
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ing of the "B" definition and that the exchange did qualify as a 
stock-for-stock "B" reorganization.16 
The court of appeals in Mills did not indicate the tax conse-
quences of its determination. As a result, the exact theory employed 
by the court to sustain its decision and the breadth of the holding 
are not easily ascertainable. Arguably, the court reached its decision 
by ignoring the cash payments for purposes of the "B" definition, 
although viewing the cash as taxable boot for purposes of section 
356.17 Alternatively, the court may have treated the cash received 
as if it were voting stock, thereby affording total nonrecognition to 
the transaction under section 354.18 If either of these interpretations 
is correct, it would seem that the Mills decision stands for the 
proposition that direct cash payments from an acquiring corporation 
are permissible not only in the fractional share context but also in 
a broader undefined category of cases. However, neither of these 
theories seems likely. In view of the fact that the court relied 
heavily upon the similarity of the method used in Mills to handle 
fractional interests and those currently permitted in conjunction 
with a "B" reorganization,19 it would seem that the court treated 
the transaction as if the shareholders of the acquired corporation 
received fractional shares and immediately sold them to the ac-
quiring corporation. Under this interpretation, the holding in !If ills 
would appear to be limited to the fractional share context. 
Although the use of a fiction does not alter the fact that the Mills 
decision is contrary to the express language of section 368(a)(l)(B) 
and the apparent import of the Supreme Court's language in the 
Southwest Consol. case, the court of appeals reached a very sensible 
result. In permitting direct cash payments for fractional shares the 
court has not only sanctioned the simplest and most efficient method 
of handling fractional interests but also seems to have fostered, 
16. Mills v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964). 
17. This is probably not the correct interpretation of the Mills decision because 
it seems to be an application of the so•called de minimis rule, which the court said 
it would not consider. See Mills v. Commissioner, supra note 16, at 325. The Tax 
Court expressly rejected the de minimis rule. Richard M. Mills, 39 T.C. 393, 401 
(1962). However, there is secondary authority to the effect that a de minimis rule 
is applicable to § 368(a)(l)(B). See 3 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 20.89, 
at 324 (Zimet & Weiss rev. 1957). 
18. The taxpayers argued for the adoption of this interpretation. See Brief for 
Petitioners, pp. 7-9, Mills v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964). Supporting the 
possibility that the court adopted this interpretation is the court's statement that "the 
reorganization involved in these cases qualified under section 368(a)(l)(B) as one involv-
ing an exchange of stock solely for stock of another corporation without any additional 
independent consideration." Mills v. Commissioner, supra, at 324. Furthermore, this 
interpretation would seem to be the import of the dissenting opinion in the Tax Court 
decision upon which the court heavily relied. See Richard M. Mills, supra note 17, at 
403 (dissenting opinion). 
19. See note 12 supra. 
April 1965] Recent Developments 1113 
rather than frustrated, basic congressional policies with respect to 
the tax treatment of reorganizations. 
Prior to 1934, a corporate readjustment literally qualified as a 
tax-free reorganization without regard to the type of consideration 
given by the acquiring corporation.20 One consequence of this def-
inition was that an outright sale of at least a majority of the stock 
of a corporation could qualify as a reorganization. To prevent this 
means of avoiding a tax on the sale of property, the courts developed 
the so-called continuity of interest test. According to this test, a 
transaction does not qualify as a reorganization unless a substantial 
part of the consideration received by the shareholders of the ac-
quired corporation consists of an ownership interest in the continu-
ing corporation.21 In 1934, Congress made substantial alterations in 
this basic statutory pattem.22 One of the changes was to include the 
solely-for-voting-stock language in the provision which was the pred-
ecessor of both the stock-for-stock "B" definition and the stock-for-
property "C" definition.23 In so doing, Congress made it clear that 
it intended to restrict the nonrecognition treatment of corporate 
reorganizations to changes in the form of continuing investments.24 
However, there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate con-
clusively why the term "solely" was used or to suggest that the use 
of solely was intended to prohibit cash payments for fractional 
shares. In a case like Mills, if a court adheres strictly to the "solely" 
requirement, all gains, even those in excess of boot, must be recog-
nized, and a stockholder may be forced to dispose of his interest in 
the continuing corporation in order to meet his tax obligation.25 
20. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(h)(l), 43 Stat. 257: "The term 're-
organization' means (A) a merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one 
corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of the 
total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or sub-
stantially all the properties of another corporation)." 
The relevant nonrecognition provisions were similar to §§ 354(a) and 356(a)(l) 
of the 1954 Code. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234 §§ 203(b)(2), (d)(l), 43 Stat. 256, 
257. 
21. See, e.g., Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935) (stock of cor-
poration making up approximately 55% of the consideration held to satisfy test); 
Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932) (assets exchanged 
for cash and short-term notes held not to qualify as a reorganization). See generally 
PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 91 (1940). 
22. See generally Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112, 48 Stat. 704. 
23. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g)(l)(B), 48 Stat. 705. See note 9 supra. 
24. See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14 (1934); S. REP. No. 558, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1934). 
25. On the other hand, under present law, a stockholder may benefit from a 
strict interpretation of solely by including a small amount of cash in a loss transac-
tion which would otherwise qualify as a "B" reorganization. Although this would 
appear to create a large loophole, losses to shareholders in the acquired corporation 
can be no more useful than capital losses in general. See INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, 
H 1211, 1212. 
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Such a result is contrary to the basic philosophy of the nonrecogni-
tion provisions that a mere change in form of ownership should not 
be a taxable event.26 Since cash payments for fractional interests 
will generally result in only a minimal diminution of the con-
tinuing ownership interest, it would seem to be more in conformance 
with congressional policy to limit the recognition of gains as was 
done in Mills. In addition, the Mills decision fosters express con-
gressional intent to minimize interference with legitimate corporate 
adjustments which tend to strengthen the financial condition of 
the participating companies.27 
Although Mills is clearly justified on policy grounds, there is no 
reason to believe that the Internal Revenue Service will acquiesce 
in the decision because of the solely-for-voting-stock language in 
section 368(a)(l)(B). Therefore, it would be unwise for taxpayers 
to rely upon Mills in planning future "B" reorganizations unless 
they are prepared to litigate and to risk the very real possibility 
that another court may not follow Ai.ills but may adhere instead to 
the literal meaning of the "solely" requirement. Thus, in spite of 
Mills, utilization of direct cash payments for fractional interests in 
"B" reorganizations will continue to be unnecessarily and unreason-
ably thwarted unless legislative action is taken to amend section 368 
so that an exchange otherwise qualifying as a "B" reorganization 
will not be disqualified because direct cash payments are made for 
fractional shares.28 Such an amendment would be in accord with 
basic congressional policy regarding the tax treatment of reorganiza-
tions and would facilitate contemplated stock-for-stock "B" re-
organizations in which fractional interests are involved. However, 
26. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-l(b) (1955); H.R. REP. No. 704, supra note 24, at 14. 
One of the underlying justifications for this policy is that when a stockholder has only 
altered the form of his corporate ownership he has received no funds from which 
to pay a tax. See Barker v. United States, 200 F.2d 223, 230 (9th Cir. 1952). 
27. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 704, supra 
note 24, at 14; S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924). 
28. Congress has previously refused to act on a more extensive proposal which 
would have relaxed the solely requirement itself to a specified percentage of voting 
stock. See H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 26 (1959). See generally Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 409-16 (1959). 
There have been a number of other proposals for the amendment of the solely-
for-voting-stock requirement of § 368(a)(l)(B). See Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Internal Revenue Taxation of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 85th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2485, 2557 (1958); 2 ALI FED. INC. TAX STAT. §§ x601, x602, 
x603, x605, comments at 209-10, 245-47, 308-17, 319-22 (Draft No. 2, 1954). See 
generally A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION, PROGRAM AND CoMMITIEE REPORTS To BE 
PRESENTED AT THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING 21 (1959); Greene, Proposed 
Definitional Changes in Reorganizations, 14 TAX L. REv. 155 (1959); Surrey, 
Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholders-American Law Institute 
Tax Project-American Association Committee Study on Legislative Revision, 14 TAX 
L REv. 1 (1959). 
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since there is no indication that this legislative action will be forth-
coming, taxpayers should continue to act with utmost care to avoid
direct cash payments for fractional interests in contemplated "B"
reorganizations.
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arose and in which the carrier neither owns nor operates any
facilities.3
Decisions subsequent to Davis indicate that the Court is reluc-
tant to extend that decision beyond its facts. 4 Thus, the commerce
clause objection may be raised only against the maintenance of a
suit on a cause of action arising outside of the forum state5 against
a foreign corporation not operating in the forum state., Although the
rationale of Davis extends to any legal entity in interstate commerce,
it is questionable whether the defense is available other than to
incorporated common carriers. 7 Moreover, the fact that the plain-
tiff is a resident of the forum state is often sufficient to dispose of
the defense.8 In addition, courts have had little difficulty in finding
that the defendant carries on sufficient activities in the forum state
to obviate the commerce clause objection.9 However, regardless of
the concern in Davis about the dilatory effect on commerce caused
by the necessity of removing trained employees from their jobs to
appear as witnesses-in distant forums,10 later decisions indicate that
there has been no incorporation of a requirement of distant wit-
nesses to limit this defense." Although this defense is of limited
3. 262 U.S. at 317.
4. See International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934);
Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix,
278 U.S. 492 (1929); Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U.S. 21 (1927); Missouri
ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924). See generally Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corpora-
tions as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 17 MINN. L. Rv. 381 (1933); McGowan,
Litigation as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 33 ILL. L. REv. 875 (1939); Comment,
45 YALE L.J. 1100, 1114-17 (1936); 44 H~Asv. L. Rxv. 863 (1931).
5. See Farrier, supra note 4, at 393-95; McGowan, supra note 4, at 880-82;
Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 1100, 1114-17 (1936).
6. See generally Farrier, supra note 4, at 393-95 (1933); McGowan, supra note 4,
at 880-82 (1939); 42 HAsv. L. Rxv. 1062, 1067 (1929).
7. See Standard Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 44 Del. (5 Terry) 538, 62 A.2d 454
(1948), appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 930 (1949). But see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) (semble); Uhich v. Hilton Mobile
Homes, 126 N.W.2d 813 (S.D. 1964). See generally McGowan, supra note 4, at 882;
Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 1100, 1117 (1936).
8. See Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 157 F.2d 1005, 1007 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947); Barnett v. Texas & P. Ry., 145 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1944);
Canadian Pac. Ry. v. Sullivan, 126 F.2d 433, 438-40 (1st Cir. 1942); Isenberg v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 82 F. Supp. 927, 928 (D. Mass. 1949). But see Zuber v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 82 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Hayman v. Southern Pac. Co., 278 S.W.2d
749 (Mo. 1955).
9. See Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., supra note 8; Barnett v. Texas & P. Ry.,
supra note 8; Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 98 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1951);
Western Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 81 F. Supp. 494 (D. Neb. 1948);
Gregg Co. v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot-Maatschappij N.V., 205 Misc.
378, 128 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Munic. Ct. New York 1953). But see Overstreet v. Canadian
Pac. Airlines, 152 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Zuber v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
supra note 8; Jablonski v. Southern Pac. Co., 76 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
Hayman v. Southern Pac. Co., supra note 8.
10. 262 U.S. at 315.
11. International Milling v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934); Denver &
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vitality today,' 2 it continues to be verbalized 13 and occasionally to
be successfully invoked.14
While recognizing its limited scope, the federal courts have not
agreed on whether the defense of an undue burden on commerce
can be asserted in the federal courts in an ordinary diversity action.
One view is represented by Overstreet v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 5
where a district court on the authority of Davis dismissed the suit
as an unconstitutional burden on commerce. Another view was
expressed in Wadell v. Green Textile Associates,'6 where a district
court found the defendant subject to jurisdiction conferred by the
general diversity jurisdiction and venue statutes.' 7 Since it is clear
that Congress has the constitutional power to burden commerce,' 8
the court reasoned that congressional action in conferring jurisdic-
tion was an exercise of that power.' 9 A third view, expressed in Wahl,
is that actions brought originally in federal courts on a diversity
basis can never unduly burden commerce since the negative im-
plications of the commerce clause limit state but not federal power.
It would seem difficult to maintain the position of Wadell that,
merely because the action is proper under the general venue and
jurisdiction provisions, Congress has exercised its power to burden
commerce by permitting jurisdiction to be asserted over a foreign
corporation having only a general sales agent in the forum state.
In Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner,20 the United States Supreme
Court did hold that the venue provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act2' compelled the federal courts to adjudicate any action
that was proper under those provisions. 22 The Court found, how-
R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932). See McGowan, supra note 4, at 886-87; 32
COLum. L. REv. 541 (1937).
12. See 33 IND. L.J. 358 (1958).
13. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 104 Ga. App. 200, 121 SXE.2d 411
(1961); Barrett v. Boston Sc Me. R.R., 104 N.H. 70, 178 A.2d 291 (1962); Fuss v.
French Natal R.R., 35 Misc. 2d 680, 231 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
14. See, e.g., Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Prod. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn.
1961) (semble); Glaser v. Pennsylvania R.R., 82 N.J. Super. 16, 196 A.2d 539 (Law Div.
1963).
15. 152 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); accord, Zuber v. Pennsylvania R.R., 82 F.
Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Jablonski v. Southern Pac. Co., 76 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y.
1948); Klepper v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 271 App. Div. 53, 62 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1946);
Cotugno v. Union Pac. Ry., 12 Misc. 2d 235, 177, N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
16. 92 F. Supp. 738 (D.C. Mass. 1950); accord, Cooke v. Kilgore Mfg. Co., 105 F.
Supp. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Brown v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 25 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.N.Y.
1938).
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1391 (1958).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Ferguson v. Ford Motor
Co., 77 F. Supp. 425, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
19. 92 F. Supp. at 742.
20. 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
21. 35 Stat. 291 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
22. 314 U.S. at 54. Compare Jablonski v. Southern Pac. Co., 76 F. Supp. 1022, 1023
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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ever, that Congress specifically intended those special venue pro-
visions to have that effect.23 On the contrary, the general diversity
power given the federal courts has not been interpreted to compel
adjudication. 24 Significantly, in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,25 the
Court held that the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins26 precludes
federal courts from entertaining diversity actions barred in state
courts by "door-closing" statutes.2 7 Although Congress has the power
to permit the federal courts to adjudicate these suits, 28 the grant of
general diversity power has not been considered an exercise of this
power.29 In terms of the implied effect of the general diversity
provisions to override limitations on federal adjudicatory power, it
would seem inconsistent with the approach in Woods, therefore,
to limit the Davis doctrine by holding that the general diversity
provisions are an exercise of congressional power to burden com-
merce by permitting suits in federal courts which Davis prohibits
in state courts.
The intimation in Wahl that the Davis doctrine is inapplicable
in the federal courts because the commerce clause limits only state
power80 is interesting, but unsupported. It is true that the Supreme
Court has never considered a defense based on Davis in a case arising
in the federal courts.81 However, the rationale of the Court in Davis
23. 314 U.S. at 49-50. See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as
Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CoaNELL L.Q. 12, 15 n.21
(1949).
24. This was explicitly recognized in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505
(1947), a forum non conveniens case, in which the Court, discussing the Kepner line
of cases, said that: "Those decisions do not purport to modify the doctrine as to
other cases governed by the general venue statutes." Another example of the absence
of compulsion under the general diversity provisions is the abstention doctrine, which
prevents federal courts from hearing certain diversity cases in which the controlling
state law is not clear. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
25. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
26. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27. See also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). See generally Meador, State
Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. Rav. 1082, 1094-96 (1963).
28. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
29. See generally Hill, .The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv.
541, 570 (1958); Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39
IND. L.J. 228, 249 (1964).
30. 227 F. Supp. at 841. If the court is correct that the commerce clause limits
only state power, an argument that the federal courts would still have to follow
state law under Erie is possible. If, in addition to the constitutional limitation, the
state has an affirmative policy in its refusal to assert jurisdiction, for example the
encouragement of limited activities in the state by foreign corporations, Erie would
seem applicable. Certainly, there is no absolute due process right to sue in an
American court. See Comment, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 830 (1955). In the absence of an
affirmative state policy, however, it is clear that Erie would not preclude the federal
courts from adjudicating the suit. Cf. Hill, supra note 29, at 570-71; Weintraub, supra
note 29, at 249-51.
31. In Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 US. 101 (1924), the Court held that
the enforcement of a judgment obtained in a state court against a foreign railroad
corporation in violation of the Davis doctrine could be enjoined by a federal court.
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that the general submission of common carriers to suit will un-
reasonably obstruct commerce applies as well to the federal courts,82
and the language of the Court broadly encompasses suits in both
court systems. 33 Moreover, since the power to regulate commerce
is vested in the legislative branch of the federal government3 4 it
would seem that the federal courts have no power to burden com-
merce. This question seems analogous to that question of executive
power presented in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,35
where there were at least four different views among the Justices
of the Supreme Court as to whether the President could exercise
any powers which fell within the legislative powers of Congress.3 6
Nevertheless, each member of that Court considered all powers of
the President to regulate commerce to be delegated powers.3 7 It
would seem clear by analogy, therefore, that the federal courts
could not burden commerce in the absence of congressional dele-
gation of that power to them.38 The inability to find a specific intent
in the general diversity provisions to burden commerce, as existed
in Kepner, would seem to preclude finding such a delegation.
Although its range of application has been narrowed,3 9 the com-
merce clause still remains a possible defense to jurisdiction, partic-
ularly appropriate to common carriers in foreign commerce. As a
constitutional method of adjusting place of trial, analogous to the
doctrine of forum non conveniens,40 its value has diminished with
the expanded use of that doctrine.41 Nevertheless, as long as the
Supreme Court does not view the Davis doctrine as discretionary,4
32. See Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923), where the
Court took notice "that litigation in States and jurisdictions remote from that in
which the cause of action arose entails absence of employees from their customary
occupations." (Emphasis added.)
33. Id. at 315-17.
34. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
35. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
36. See Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case-Congress, the President and the Supreme
Court, 51 MicH. L. REv. 141, 177 (1952). Justices Black and Douglas considered the
President powerless to act in the sphere of legislative powers of Congress without
express authorization. See ibid.
37. Id. at 175. See also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th
Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
38. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), where the argument was made that the
federal courts could not enjoin conduct interfering with interstate commerce unless
authorized to do so by Congress. The Court sustained the injunction on the basis
of a finding of congressional policy. See Kauper, supra note 36, at 148.
39. See notes 4-14 supra and accompanying text.
40. See Farrier, supra note 4, at 392.
41. See generally Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALF. L.
Rav. 380 (1947); Comment, 29 U. CH. L. REv. 740 (1962).
42. Mr. Justice Jackson viewed Davis as really a forum non conveniens case.
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUm.
L. Rv. 1, 31 (1945). See also Bickel, supra note 23, at 17 n.28. This view has been
criticized. See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. R1v. 908, 913
(1947).
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as is forum non conveniens, and as long as there is no specific con-
gressional authorization to burden commerce by permitting suits in
the federal courts in these situations, the defense to the assertion of
jurisdiction of an undue burden on commerce must be considered
applicable in the federal courts.
